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LAW AND POLITICS, AN EMERGING 
EPIDEMIC: A CALL FOR EVIDENCE-
BASED PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 
Michael R. Ulrich† 
 
As Jacobson v. Massachusetts recognized in 1905, the basis of public health law, 
and its ability to limit constitutional rights, is the use of scientific data and empirical 
evidence. Far too often, this important fact is lost. Fear, misinformation, and politics 
frequently take center stage and drive the implementation of public health law. In the 
recent Ebola scare, political leaders passed unnecessary and unconstitutional 
quarantine measures that defied scientific understanding of the disease and caused 
many to have their rights needlessly constrained. Looking at HIV criminalization and 
exemptions to childhood vaccine requirements, it becomes clear that the blame cannot 
be placed on the hysteria that accompanies emergencies. Indeed, these examples 
merely illustrate an unfortunate array of examples where empirical evidence is 
ignored in the hopes of quelling paranoia. These policy approaches are not only 
constitutionally questionable, they generate their own risk to public health. The ability 
of the law to jeopardize public health approaches to infectious disease control can, 
and should, be limited through a renewed emphasis on science as the foundation of 
public health, coordination through all levels and branches of government, and 
through a serious commitment by the judiciary to provide oversight. Infectious disease 
creates public anxiety, but this cannot justify unwarranted dogmatic approaches as a 
response. If we as a society hope to ensure efficient, constitutional control over the 
spread of disease, it is imperative that science take its rightful place at the forefront of 
governmental decision-making and judicial review. Otherwise, the law becomes its 
own public health threat. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill warned, “[t]he preventative function of 
government . . . is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the 
punitory function . . . .”1 This has indeed played out on numerous occasions 
throughout this country’s history, especially when driven by the paranoia and 
misinformation that tends to accompany the potential spread of infectious disease.2 
“An epidemic of fear has accompanied the spread of the disease and with it, public 
attention has turned to quarantine, one of the oldest tools of public health.”3 Wendy 
Parmet wrote this in 1985 in reference to the AIDS epidemic and the call to quarantine 
infected individuals; nevertheless, it is equally applicable for the 2014 Ebola 
“outbreak” in the United States where fear spread almost uncontrollably.4  
Mainstream media outlets ran stories with attention grabbing headlines, such as 
Ebola Cases Could Reach 1.4 Million Within Four Months, C.D.C. Estimates.5 What 
likely raised more concern were the reports about the possibility, or even likelihood,6 
that the virus would mutate and become airborne.7 With the pervasiveness of these 
news stories during the Ebola epidemic, it is no surprise that the United States public 
began to panic, with two-thirds of Americans worried about a widespread epidemic 
                                                 
1 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 56 (1880). 
2 Wendy E. Parmet, J.S. Mill and the American Law of Quarantine, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 210, 214 
(2008) [hereinafter Parmet, J.S. Mill]. 
3 Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
53, 53 (1985) [hereinafter Parmet, AIDS] (footnote omitted). 
4 See id. Though the term outbreak was often applied, its use was questionable given the disease and 
threat of spreading. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
5 Denise Grady, Ebola Cases Could Reach 1.4 Million Within Four Months, C.D.C. Estimates, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/health/ebola-cases-could-reach-14-million-in-
4-months-cdc-estimates.html?_r=0. Within the text of the story it became clear that this was merely a 
projection of a worst-case scenario. Id. 
6 Lizzie Parry, It Is ‘Very Likely’ That the Ebola Virus Will Spread Through Airborne Particles, 
Experts Say, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2961381/It-likely-
Ebola-virus-spread-airborne-particles-say-experts.html. 
7 Sarah Larimer, Will the Ebola Virus Go Airborne? (And Is That Even the Right Question?), WASH. 
POST (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2014/09/15/will-the-ebola-
virus-go-airborne-and-is-that-even-the-right-question/ [http://perma.cc/LF6Q-5ESE]; Michael T. Osterholm, 
What We’re Afraid to Say About Ebola, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/opinion/what-were-afraid-to-say-about-ebola.html. A response to 
Osterholm’s New York Times article was published in the presumably less popular Virology Blog, 
explaining that the chance of Ebola mutating to create an airborne threat was “so remote that we should not 
use it to frighten people.” Vincent Racaniello, What We Are Not Afraid to Say About Ebola Virus, 
VIROLOGY BLOG  (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.virology.ws/2014/09/18/what-we-are-not-afraid-to-say-
about-ebola-virus/ [http://perma.cc/3RZM-8VJK]. 




breaking out in the states, even though that epidemic was almost entirely contained to 
West Africa.8 After all, “[e]xaggerated risks . . . produce extreme responses.”9 
That a community can be plagued by such hysteria during an infectious disease 
scare is not necessarily unexpected,10 but when fear is almost completely unfounded, 
hysteria generates its own potential harm. Ultimately, the Ebola “emergency” in the 
United States resulted in four confirmed cases and one death,11 which is nothing to 
overlook, but not close to the potential airborne outbreak that many feared. Yet, the 
alarm and politicization of the fear turned the law into a new threat to public health.  
In the aftermath of the Ebola scare, there was a failure to assess the harm caused 
by those in leadership positions whose desire to appease the fearful masses lead them 
to make decisions and wield the law in a manner that may have jeopardized disease 
control efforts.12 By disregarding expertise and empirical evidence, too many public 
officials made uninformed decisions with indifference to the impact those decisions 
might have on the ability to contain the disease.13 Moreover, both the lack of informed 
decision-making and the subjugation of civil liberties that ran counter to effective 
public health science raise serious concerns of constitutionality. 
The story of Kaci Hickox, a nurse who worked with Doctors Without Borders to 
fight Ebola in Sierra Leone, is an example of the consequences that can result from 
dogmatic approaches to infectious disease control.14 On October 24, 2014, Ms. Hickox 
landed at Newark Liberty International Airport,15 the same day that the governors of 
New York and New Jersey announced mandatory quarantines for anyone who had 
contact with an individuals infected with Ebola.16 Using a forehead scanner, officials 
found that Ms. Hickox had a recorded temperature of 101 degrees.17 Given that she 
had an initial reading of 98 degrees, Ms. Hickox stated that the slightly elevated 
temperature could have been caused by being flushed, frustrated, and stressed from 
                                                 
8 Brady Dennis & Peyton M. Craighill, Ebola Poll: Two-thirds of Americans Worried About Possible 




9 George J. Annas, Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health, 55 FLA L. REV. 1171, 
1178 (2003). All the more reason why public health response should be based on science for accurate risk 
assessment. Id. 
10 See James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Myths of Ebola Preparedness and Response, NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS, & PUB. POL’Y 355, 357 (2015) (finding that the public’s understanding of risk and governmental 
power can become distorted during a perceived public health threat, especially if propelled by irresponsible, 
misinformed media).  
11 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa – Case Counts, CDC, (updated Mar. 3, 2016), 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html [http://perma.cc/4RP9-DXWV]. 
12 See Mark A. Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 5 (2015) 
(blaming the United States’ response to Ebola, in part, on “elected officials who ignored the advice of public 
health experts and imposed unnecessary quarantines that succeeded only in spreading public panic”).  
13 Id. (finding it counterproductive for states to disregard CDC recommendations despite a lack of 
evidence that their measures of social distancing would improve the chance to control disease spread). 




16 Governor Andrew Cuomo’s Press Office, Governor Andrew Cuomo and Governor Chris Christie 
Announce Additional Screening Protocols for Ebola at JFK and Newark Liberty International Airports (Oct. 
24, 2014), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-andrew-cuomo-and-governor-chris-christie-
announce-additional-screening-protocols-ebola [http://perma.cc/F46Q-DHW5]. 
17 Kaci Hickox, Her Story: UTA Grad Isolated at New Jersey Hospital in Ebola Quarantine, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/ebola/headlines/20141025-uta-grad-isolated-
at-new-jersey-hospital-as-part-of-ebola-quarantine.ece [http://perma.cc/ZW7L-5JME]. 





being in custody for four hours with little food, water, or information about why she 
was being detained.18 After working for weeks to treat Ebola patients, and waiting for 
six hours in an airport,19 Ms. Hickox was then taken to a tent outside of University 
Hospital in Newark, where she was tested again with an oral thermometer, which is 
more accurate.20 Despite normal readings, negative blood tests, and no sign of 
symptoms, Ms. Hickox was held in the tent for eighty hours before being escorted 
back to her home in Maine amidst the threat of a lawsuit against the State of New 
Jersey.21  
This story is just a microcosm of the manner in which politicization of public 
health can impact individuals and efforts to fight infectious disease. Ms. Hickox had 
her individual rights unnecessarily constrained, but this type of treatment of a 
healthcare worker could have downstream effects on the ability to convince other 
healthcare workers to join the frontline battle of containment and treatment. Though 
quarantining asymptomatic individuals is not the only manner in which 
misinformation, hysteria, and politics can play a large role in public health decision-
making, it goes to the heart of the challenge of public health law: “the balancing of 
individual and societal interests.”22 Improper justification for decisions raises both 
public health and constitutional concerns.  
Although the law establishes substantial powers to protect the public’s health, it is 
worth considering whether the use of these powers does in fact lead to better health 
outcomes. The use of public health authority and coercive measures is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to ensure protection of the public’s health, and use of this 
power cannot be justified unless it has a reasonable, scientifically based ability to 
protect the general welfare. While the law is often discussed as a way to improve 
health, it is important to note that the law can also have adverse health impacts. If used 
improperly, the use of public health powers could enable the spread of disease and, 
consequently, become a danger to the population’s wellbeing.23 
Part I of this article examines the foundation of public health law, which uses 
scientific and data-driven decision-making to justify infringement upon individual 
liberties. While there can be no doubt that the government has the authority, and 
arguably the obligation, to infringe upon individual interests for the protection of the 
general welfare, it is just as certain that this power in not unbounded. The individual 
can only be asked to sacrifice for the common good when that sacrifice is likely to in 
fact protect the public’s health, and even then, only to the extent necessary to achieve 
that goal.   
Part II illustrates that the scientific foundations of public health law’s power are 
often overlooked and ignored, thereby generating an independent public health threat. 
While this happens in emergency situations such as an Ebola outbreak, the emergence 
of legal threats cannot be blamed merely on the irrationality that stems from a sudden 
crisis. Indeed, even policies aimed at minimizing the public health impact of HIV and 
childhood infectious diseases succumb to politics rather than reasoning based in the 
law and public health.  




21 Id.; Hodge, supra note 10, at 367-68; Sheri Fink, Ebola Crisis Passes, but Questions on Quarantines 
Persist, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/health/ebola-crisis-passes-but-
questions-on-quarantines-persist.html. 
22 Rothstein, supra note 12, at 5. 
23 See discussion infra Part II. 




Part III makes a plea for a reemphasis of the connection between science, 
empirical evidence, and public health law. Regardless of the level or branch of 
government discussed, science too often takes a backseat to the momentum of politics 
and fear. To truly fight disease outbreaks, the focus must be on health—meaning that 
evidence-based law must be at the forefront of public health decision-making. Ad hoc, 
unjustifiable responses have the potential to diminish trust, drive people from the 
healthcare system or to conceal their potential infections, and discourage or punish 
essential healthcare workers. Keeping in mind the realities of limited resources, 
adopted policies must be likely to generate better health, which may require more 
stringent judicial oversight. Evidence-based law is necessary because misinformed 
enforcement mechanisms tend to exacerbate negative health outcomes, as well as 
violate constitutional standards. 
II.  SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 
Public health law has been defined as: 
[T]he study of the legal powers and duties of the state, in collaboration 
with its partners . . . to ensure the conditions for people to be healthy . . . 
and of the limitations on the power of the state to constrain for the 
common good the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, and other 
legally protected interests . . . .24  
In other words, public health law means determining the appropriate balance between 
what the government is obligated and authorized to do to protect the public’s health, 
and what it cannot do in terms of infringing on individual rights.25 Implicit in this 
definition is that the government must take positive action to ensure the public’s 
health, and in terms of infectious diseases, even those who argue for a limited scope of 
governmental public health authority find that preventing the spread of disease falls 
within the State’s obligations.26 The government takes public health action through the 
police power, which is “[t]he inherent authority of the state . . . to enact laws and 
promulgate regulations to protect, preserve, and promote the health, safety, morals, 
and general welfare of the people.”27 
In terms of infectious disease response, the balance between both the State’s 
obligations and its limitations is key. Individuals can act as carriers and spread the 
                                                 
24 LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (2d ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter GOSTIN, POWER]. 
25 See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that “the central ethical conflict of public health [is] the 
balancing of individual and societal interests”). 
26 GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 24, at 5-6 (“The government has primary responsibility for the public’s 
health.”). Those who prefer a more narrow focus on public health, rather than addressing underlying social, 
economic, and ecological causes of injury and disease, still include infectious disease control as a duty of the 
state). Id. at 39. 
27 Id. at 91–92. This authority can be used on a broad spectrum from slight inconveniences to 
substantial restrictions on individual liberties; for example, fluoridation of water, helmet and seat belt laws, 
to compulsory vaccinations, quarantine and isolation, and even forced medical treatment. Michael Ulrich, 
With Child, Without Rights?: Restoring a Pregnant Woman’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Through 
the HIV Lens, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 303, 323–34 (2012) [hereinafter Ulrich, With Child]. Involuntary 
governmental administration of medical treatment is only allowable in extremely rare circumstances where 
there is a judicial determination that the treatment is in the best medical interest of the individual given their 
condition, is the least intrusive means necessary to further an essential government interest, and is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects inhibiting that government interest. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 
166, 179 (2003). Despite the safety and efficacy of vaccinations, they are still only compelled indirectly. 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (holding a statute constitutional that required a healthy 
individual to pay a fine for refusing to receive a smallpox vaccination). 





disease; yet, a government may do more harm than good when it unnecessarily 
oversteps its bounds by restricting individual liberty. If people are going to be asked to 
sacrifice for the greater good, it is important that they only be asked to accept a 
limitation on their liberty when absolutely necessary, and in the least restrictive means 
required to achieve that end. Therefore, it is vital that these decisions be based on 
sound scientific evidence in order to maintain public trust, even among individuals 
who have their own rights constrained. 
In the seminal public health law case Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Court made it clear that “the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to 
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to 
be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from restraint.”28 The Court held 
as “settled principle[] [that] the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at 
least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will 
protect the public health and the public safety.”29 With recognized authority to limit 
individual liberty for the betterment of public health, the question becomes what, if 
anything, inhibits the ability of the government to use this power. 
Subsequent cases have illustrated that the individual right in question is not a 
limitation because even the most fundamental constitutionally protected rights can be 
overridden by a duty to protect the general welfare. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Court made clear that “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to 
ill health or death.”30 Indeed, the Court has found broad discretion within the police 
powers.31 Despite the fact that this authority is to be used to protect the public, a power 
so vast must be limited in order to limit the potential for abuse.32 After all, “even the 
police power is subordinate to the Constitution.”33 
Within the Jacobson decision there is an inherent tension between “social-
compact theory” and a “theory of limited government.”34 Yet, the opinion provides 
guidelines for how to balance these two competing theories.35 First, a risk of harm or 
public health threat must be identified to ensure there is a necessity for government 
action and to prevent the government from acting arbitrarily.36 Next, there must be an 
                                                 
28 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. 
29 Id. at 25. 
30 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). 
31 See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (citing Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 
(1905)) (noting that courts “ha[ve] settled that the municipality may vest in its officials broad discretion in 
matters affecting the application and enforcement of a health law”). 
32 See Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 2, at 215 (finding that a “willingness to accept almost without 
question an official’s claim that quarantine was justified opened the door to quarantine’s abuse”) (citation 
omitted). 
33 Parmet, AIDS, supra note 3, at 70. 
34 Lawrence O. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and Civil Liberties in 
Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 579 (2005). 
35 See generally Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11. It may be worth noting that Lawrence Gostin describes the 
floor of constitutional protection established in Jacobson through four overlapping standards: “necessity, 
reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance.” Id. at 579. Although there are similarities between 
his description and my own, I find that the categories and protections as I describe them are more distinct 
from one another and, thus, clarify the steps that should be taken when evaluating any public health 
measure. The approach described also fits within typical case law structure of multi-prong tests where step-
by-step analysis is required. 
36 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12, 27-28 (using phrases such as “necessary for the public health,” “arbitrary 
requirement,” and “necessity of the case ”); see also Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 2, at 213 (finding that the 
Jacobson court would only uphold the compulsory vaccination when there was evidence “that smallpox 
existed in the community”). But see Ulrich, With Child, supra note 27, at 327–28 (determining that the risk 




evaluation of whether the approach taken by the state can reasonably be expected to 
prevent or mitigate the threat.37 Finally, there must be a determination of whether the 
benefits provided by the public health measure justify the burdens it imposes on civil 
liberties.38 
Inherent in each of these steps is the necessary role that science and data must 
play. An accurate assessment on any of the three prongs requires some expertise or 
empirical analysis. While scientific data may not necessarily be dispositive of any of 
the three prongs, it undoubtedly should help to clarify each to some degree. More 
importantly, the use of data adds to the objectivity and transparency of evaluating 
public health measures. The police power grants extremely broad discretion to infringe 
upon our most fundamental rights.39 As such, the importance of scientific data in 
determining the legality of public health measures cannot be overstated. 
Another aspect to this evaluation that is often overlooked, but can be construed as 
an additional protective layer of individual rights, is the burden of proof. By beginning 
with the threat and the means taken to mitigate that threat, the initial burden of proof 
inevitably lies with the State.40 In Jacobson, the Court stated that smallpox, certainly a 
serious disease, was prevalent and that the threat was increasing.41 The Court found 
that mandatory vaccination was the “method[] most usually employed to eradicate 
th[e] disease,”42 and that the effectiveness of vaccines in preventing the spread of 
disease was accepted by “most members of the medical profession.”43 Therefore, the 
Court maintained that the methods taken to reduce the harm of smallpox had a “real or 
substantial relation to the protection of the public health.”44  
Once the Court found that vaccinations were shown to prevent the spread of 
smallpox without generally increasing harms, the burden shifted to the individual 
challenging the regulation to prove that it was invalid as applied to them.45 
Importantly, scientific evidence again takes a primary role. The Jacobson Court was 
critical of the fact that the plaintiff offered little more than his opinion about his lack of 
                                                                                                                      
of transmitting HIV from woman to fetus while pregnant or during birth would not constitute a public health 
threat warranting governmental intrusion). 
37 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31 (evaluating whether the means utilized by the state have a “real” and 
“substantial relation” to the protection of the public health); see also Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 2, at 213 
(stating that the Court could only uphold the policy if vaccinations were reasonably expected to prevent an 
epidemic). 
38 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (explaining that where the law “went beyond the necessity of the case and 
under the guise of exerting a police power invaded the domain of Federal authority and violated rights 
secured by the Constitution, this court deemed it to be its duty to hold such laws invalid”). This third step 
can be done as a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. For example, while vaccinations may be an apt 
policy generally, they may be unreasonable for an individual who has contraindications such that the 
vaccination would seriously jeopardize their health. See, e.g., id. at 30 (describing the statute’s exception for 
individuals who are “unfit” to receive vaccinations). Conversely, quarantining an individual who was 
exposed to Ebola and had symptoms of infection may be upheld, while a policy that carried a mandatory 
quarantine for anyone returning from any African country, including those with no known cases, would fail 
due to overinclusiveness. See, e.g., Order Pending Hearing at 3, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (D. 
Me. Oct. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Hickox Order] (holding that the state did not prove by “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the requested mandatory quarantine was necessary to protect the public health). 
39 See, e.g., Rebecca Haffajee et al., What is a Public Health “Emergency”?, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
986, 988 (2014) (“[C]oncerns about due process are amplified when emergency orders restrict individual 
freedoms and property rights.”). 
40 See Ann L. Abbott, A Summary of Florida’s Law of Quarantine of Persons and Public Health Law 
Reform Issues, 2 FL. PUB. HEALTH REV. 10, 12 (2005). 
41 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27. 
42 Id. at 28. 
43 Id. at 34. 
44 Id. at 31. 
45 Id. at 35-36. 





faith in vaccinations.46 The Court conceded that it is unconstitutional to subject an 
individual to vaccination whose body or health is in a condition that would render the 
treatment “cruel and inhuman[e].”47 Yet, in this particular case the plaintiff had not 
met his burden of proof, and all evidence suggested “that the vaccine matter to be used 
in his case was such as any medical practitioner of good standing would regard as 
proper to be used.”48 
By placing the burden of proof on the State to produce evidence of a public health 
threat and to demonstrate a response that can mitigate that threat with benefits that 
generally outweigh its burdens, the judiciary increases the objectivity, transparency, 
and accountability of public health measures. While the explicit data analysis in 
Jacobson is a bit thin, the opinion must be understood in the context of its time. In 
1905, infectious diseases were the leading cause of death, the federal government had 
little involvement in health matters, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) was 
not yet created, and most vaccines were fifty years away.49 Still, subsequent public 
health law cases bear out the fact that data play a key role in determining 
constitutionality of government action. 
In Boone v. Boozman, the plaintiff challenged the state requirement that children 
be immunized against Hepatitis B to attend school.50 After acknowledging the state’s 
authority under the police power to infringe upon fundamental rights of religious 
freedom and parental rights in favor of the benefit of the public’s health, the court 
turned to the threat in question.51 As the plaintiff argued, and the court conceded, 
Hepatitis B did not present the same public health emergency of harm that smallpox 
did.52 Nonetheless, the court held, correctly, that Jacobson did not limit its holding “to 
diseases presenting a clear and present danger.”53 To make a determination whether 
Hepatitis B created a threat that warranted state action, the court turned to science and 
empirical evidence.54 
There is no defined threshold of what constitutes a threat warranting state action, 
but the use of scientific data adds transparency to the determination, which can be 
more accurately evaluated at a later time.55 Thus, while the facts alone may not be 
dispositive of appropriate government intervention, the examination of the facts is a 
requirement. In the case of Hepatitis B, the court recognized that the virus is spread by 
bodily fluids and can survive on surfaces for up to a month.56 “Hepatitis B [infection] 
can lead to sclerosis, scarring and fibrosis of the liver, or liver cancer after chronic 
infection[,] . . . . [and] [g]lobally [it] is [the] second . . . leading cause of cancer.”57 The 
court noted that approximately 1.25 million people have chronic Hepatitis B infection 
in the United States, with an estimated 80,000 individuals contracting the virus each 
                                                 
46 Id. at 35-37. 
47 Id. at 38–39. 
48 Id. at 37. 
49 Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Great-Grandfather’s 
Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581, 582 (2005). 
50 Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 941 (E.D. Ark. 2002). 
51 Id. at 954. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. (emphasis added). 
54 See id. 
55 See generally Ronald Bayer, The Continuing Tensions Between Individual Rights and Public Health: 
Talking Point on Public Health Versus Civil Liberties, 8 EMBO REPS. 1099 (2007) (discussing the lack of 
any clear criteria for what constitutes a public health threat, and exploring the resulting tensions between 
exercises of police power and civil liberties). 
56 See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002). 
57 Id.  




year.58 Finding this to be a credible public health threat, the court held that 
immunization of school children, which has been an accepted use of police power 
since the early twentieth century, was reasonable given its “real and substantial 
relation to the protection of the public health . . . .”59  
Interestingly, the court went beyond this initial assessment to examine risk factors, 
noting that “groups at highest risk for Hepatitis B are unlikely to self-identify and 
pursue the vaccine.”60 The court felt this, in addition to the fact that it was a 
recommended strategy, further justified the required vaccinations.61 Widely used 
vaccinations almost always pass the balancing test due to their minute risk of harm to 
the average individual and their substantial effectiveness in prevention.62 With the 
plaintiff unable to then meet her burden of proof with evidence that the child would 
suffer uncommon harm that would outweigh the benefits, the court upheld the 
measure.63 
Conversely, cases decided in the name of public health law that do not use 
appropriate evaluation and evidentiary standards can set unlawful precedent that 
endangers the health and welfare of society. One of the most egregious examples is 
Buck v. Bell, where the Court cited to Jacobson for sustaining the forced sterilization 
of an eighteen-year-old mentally disabled woman in the name of protecting the public 
welfare.64 This case was wrong in every conceivable way, and if it seems misplaced in 
a public health discussion, that is because it indisputably should not have been upheld 
under the authority of public health law—or any other law for that matter. Yet, it 
provides an extreme example of a court blindly paying deference to an overly broad 
concept of police powers, with the Court holding that the “principle that sustains 
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.”65  
In a short opinion considering the unlawful invasion of bodily integrity, the threat 
to general welfare that the Court cites is that institutionalized “defective[]” persons 
may become “a menace” and that the reduction of this population would “prevent our 
being swamped with incompetence.”66 The Court states that “heredity plays an 
important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility,” and that the plaintiff “is the 
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring.”67 Offering no science, data, 
or analysis to support the connection between this supposed threat to society and 
sterilization reducing such a threat, the Court held that if the State is of the “opinion 
that it is for the best interests of the patient and of society” that an individual be 
sterilized, this opinion alone was satisfactory.68  
The Court enforced no burden of proof on the State69 and unconstitutionally 
accepted the State’s opinion as fact. In balancing the benefits against the burdens on 
the individual, the Court found little risk of harm at all, and instead concluded that the 
sterilization procedure could be conducted “without detriment to her general health 
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and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization.”70 As a 
result of this decision, more than 60,000 people were sterilized, most of whom were 
poor women.71 Though this case may seem draconian and unrealistic in a modern 
discussion of public health law, the fact that sterilizations under this holding continued 
into the late 1970s displays the dangers of evaluation without the requirement of 
science and how public health law can be misused for targeted discrimination.72 In 
Buck, the Court discussed the procedural requirements for evaluating the case of 
someone suggested for sterilization.73 Yet, what good is the right to due process if it 
entails little more than judicial deference to decisions made in the name of public 
welfare but that are based simply on opinion?  
Certainly “science is not value neutral” and can be distorted.74 Its inclusion in no 
way guarantees a just outcome nor eliminates the risk of abusing power. However, 
placing the burden of proof upon the State to justify the means of protecting the 
public’s health with empirical evidence should deter abuses of authority when the 
State faces a threat of infectious disease. It also empowers the judiciary to eschew an 
archaic era of judicial deference and earnestly balance the liberties of individuals 
against state efforts to protect society at large. 
III.  FEAR AND POLITICS: HOW THE LAW BECOMES A PUBLIC HEALTH 
 THREAT 
As we continue to battle infectious diseases in the future and determine how best 
to approach the threat posed to the public, the role of scientific data and empirical 
evidence must be at the forefront of the discussion. Though this point may seem 
obvious, there are countless examples through our nation’s history that prove 
otherwise. Indeed, infectious diseases present an appealing study in public health law 
because their connection to science is so readily apparent, yet there is an abundance of 
examples exhibiting the ease with which the role of science can be forgotten. As fear, 
misinformation, and politics push the objectivity of empirical evidence to the outer 
edges of infectious disease response, the data-driven requirements of the law are often 
ignored. 
The spread of paranoia creates questions in terms of the legality of public health 
measures. Without sound scientific reasoning, many infectious disease responses may 
in fact be unconstitutional. Moreover, when decisions are made based on distorted 
information and lobbying for public approval, they can in actuality generate their own 
potential harm to the community. By succumbing to the politicization of how to handle 
infectious disease, state officials often ignore their constitutional obligations to protect 
the public health through reasonable approaches that have a substantial chance to 
mitigate the risk to the general welfare. While it may be suspected that this is most 
likely to occur during emergencies, the power of panic and personal beliefs can 
transform the law into its own hazard even when it comes to more chronic infectious 
diseases.  
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A.  EBOLA AND PUBLIC HEALTH “EMERGENCIES” 
The recent Ebola outbreak presents an interesting example of the reaction to 
public health emergencies because there is debate over whether it can actually be 
considered a public health emergency. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa certainly 
qualifies, with over 28,000 cases and over 11,000 deaths.75 But when focusing on the 
threat in the United States, the appropriateness of the label “emergency” is less clear. 
There were four confirmed cases of Ebola in the United States, with one death;76 yet, 
the media coverage made it seem as though the country was in the midst of an 
emerging epidemic.77 In reality, “[a] handful of domestic cases of a non-airborne, 
slowly-spreading condition like [Ebola] does not constitute an imminent threat to the 
larger population’s health.”78 In fact, only Connecticut declared a state of emergency,79 
but at least twenty-three states enacted quarantine measures.80  
Though there is some question as to the severity and scope of the threat that Ebola 
posed, quarantine under the right circumstances could be a reasonable method to 
control the spread of the disease.81 However, despite the mishandling of the initial 
Ebola patient in Dallas, Texas,82 and the highly publicized travels through New York 
City of a doctor who was infected,83 the response was unnecessarily extreme. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) issued guidance on risk 
categories and justifications for quarantine and isolation measures,84 yet it was 
summarily rejected by the twenty-three states passing quarantine measures, which all 
opted for stricter policies.85  
To be sure, states are under no legal obligation to follow the CDC’s 
recommendations.86 However, they are still obligated to meet constitutional 
requirements when using their police power and rejecting the guidance of a federal 
agency, whose expertise is in creating a patchwork approach to infectious disease 
                                                 
75 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa – Case Counts, supra note 11. 
76 Id. 
77 Hodge, supra note 10, at 361-62. 
78 Id. at 363. 
79 Id. at 364. 
80 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & YALE GLOBAL HEALTH JUSTICE PARTNERSHIP, FEAR, 
POLITICS, AND EBOLA: HOW QUARANTINES HURT THE FIGHT AGAINST EBOLA AND VIOLATE THE 
CONSTITUTION 26 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu-ebolareport.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/MVA7-KWZA] [hereinafter ACLU & GHJP]. 
81 See Andrew C. McCarthy, Ebola-Quarantine Objections Are Frivolous, NATIONAL REVIEW (Nov. 1, 
2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/391642/ebola-quarantine-objections-are-frivolous-andrew-c-
mccarthy [http://perma.cc/GAV9-3386].  
82 Rothstein, supra note 12, at 5. 
83 Marc Santora, Doctor in New York City Is Sick with Ebola, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/nyregion/craig-spencer-is-tested-for-ebola-virus-at-bellevue-hospital-
in-new-york-city.html. 
84 See generally ACLU & GHJP, supra note 80. Though the terms isolation and quarantine are often 
conflated, it should be noted that they are indeed different. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 24, at 428. 
“[I]solation is the separation, for the period of communicability, of known infected persons in such places 
and under such conditions as to prevent or limit the transmission of the infectious   agent.” GOSTIN, POWER, 
supra note 24, at 429 (emphasis in original). “[Q]uarantine is the restriction of the movement of persons who 
have been exposed, or potentially exposed, to infectious disease, during its period of communicability, to 
prevent transmission of infection during the incubation period.” GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 24, at 429. This 
paper will focus on quarantine, which is a more controversial and questionable infringement on the freedom 
of movement given that the individual being quarantined is not in fact infected with the disease. 
85 ACLU & GHJP, supra note 80, at 26. 
86 Id. at 36-37. 





containment across multiple states, is highly questionable.87 It raises concern about the 
scientific justification that the State is using for its own approach, if there is any, and 
makes it more difficult for the public to understand what criteria or threshold is being 
used in any given state.88 
The fact that every state that rejected the guidelines of the CDC opted for stricter 
quarantine guidelines, thereby further imposing on individual rights, runs contrary to 
the precedent that the government must undertake the “least restrictive alternative.”89 
In many of these states, the governors were facing reelection.90 For example, Governor 
Christie of New Jersey, in a reelection campaign, declared that any healthcare workers 
returning to his state from treating Ebola patients in West Africa were going to be 
subject to mandatory quarantine for up to three weeks.91 This led to the highly 
publicized quarantine of Kaci Hickox, discussed earlier, who was held for eighty hours 
in a makeshift tent with little evidence of infection other than a temporary reading of a 
fever from a forehead scanner, which was later found to be inaccurate.92 New Jersey 
was by no means the only state to implement a mandatory twenty-one day quarantine: 
in Connecticut, Governor Dan Malloy, in a tight race for reelection, implemented 
mandatory quarantines for anyone traveling from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, 
regardless of whether they had any contact with Ebola victims.93 Further, once Ms. 
Hickox was released to return to her home in Maine, the governor there also 
unnecessarily placed her under mandatory quarantine, although this quarantine was to 
take place in her home.94  
In a scientific and data-based opinion, a district court judge held that Maine’s 
mandatory quarantine was invalid.95 The court relied on information about Ebola and 
the dangers of infection provided by members of the CDC, including the fact that 
“[i]ndividuals infected with Ebola Virus Disease who are not showing symptoms are 
not yet infectious.”96 Applying this information and the standards set under Jacobson, 
the court held that the State did not meet its burden of establishing “clear and 
convincing evidence” that the mandatory quarantine was necessary to protect the 
public’s health.97  
The court also made a point to recognize “the misconceptions, misinformation, 
bad science and bad information being spread from shore to shore in our country with 
respect to Ebola,” and did not succumb to the political pressures to stray from the 
precedential requirements of public health law.98 Following sound public health policy, 
the court employed the least restrictive means necessary and ordered Ms. Hickox to 
participate in direct active monitoring, to coordinate her travel with public health 
authorities, and to immediately notify officials if any symptoms appeared.99 The 
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contrast between this approach and that of Governor Christie, who initially 
quarantined Ms. Hickox and refused to admit overstepping legal authority, 
demonstrates the difference between effective, legally sound public health law and an 
authoritarian approach to protecting the general welfare.100 
Scientific and medical institutions, along with infectious disease experts, spoke 
out against unjustified and unnecessary quarantine measures.101 The quarantine of 
individuals who are asymptomatic or who have not been exposed to Ebola is 
scientifically baseless and, thus, a violation of their constitutional rights.102 Given its 
restriction on individual freedom, quarantine is perhaps the most intrusive public 
health measure outside of treatment by force.103 As such, it should not be undertaken 
lightly.  
“[Q]uarantine is justified only when there is no other intervention available to 
prevent the spread of disease that would be less restrictive of liberty.”104 Yet, in 
Connecticut alone, at least nine people were quarantined who had no “documented 
exposure to patients with disease.”105 These numbers, however, are only those that the 
state has reported. There was at least one other person in Connecticut who was 
unofficially quarantined in a hotel room for two days.106 The lack of data and 
transparency around quarantine actions creates an inability to accurately assess and 
account for the constitutional violations and burdens suffered.107  
A recent report analyzed public accounts to determine that at least forty people 
were formally quarantined in eighteen states, with another 233 individuals under 
“voluntary” quarantine.108 These voluntary quarantines are perhaps most troubling, as 
effectuating due process rights becomes even more difficult if there is no formal 
request for quarantine. The use of coercion makes the infringement on liberties even 
more unsettling, and likely increases the harm to the public by inducing stress and 
elevating the psychological toll these people suffer. For example, a physician at 
Stanford was threatened with six months in jail if he fought a quarantine and then 
received professional scorn for hurting the recruitment of volunteers to help fight 
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Ebola abroad when public officials announced in the press that he was voluntarily 
quarantining himself.109 
These examples demonstrate the indirect harms that are suffered in addition to the 
violation of rights and freedoms. As misinformation and fear spread, however, the 
government is not the only threat capable of causing indirect harm and coerced 
quarantines. In Oklahoma, under public pressure, a teacher agreed to a “voluntary” 
quarantine for twenty-one days after a trip to Rwanda, which had zero cases of Ebola 
and is thousands of miles away from the western portion of Africa where the Ebola 
outbreak occurred.110 Another teacher in Kentucky resigned amidst pressure after she 
returned from a mission trip to Kenya, which is also thousands of miles from where 
the outbreak occurred and had no reported Ebola cases.111 Meanwhile, at least twenty 
children nationwide were banned from school due to Ebola paranoia, including a seven 
year old girl who “traveled to Nigeria after it had been declared Ebola-free by the 
[World Health Organization].”112 These actions only help to spread hysteria and lead 
to drastic consequences: for example, two boys who were beaten by other students in 
the Bronx after returning from a trip to Senegal, which had one case of Ebola.113 
“Th[is] toxic mix of scientific ignorance and paranoia” was endemic in every facet 
of society.114 From the media, to politicians, and to the public, each one seemed to feed 
off of the erroneous information and anxiety of the other.115 The Ebola response can be 
directly linked to “misinformation, politicization,” and hysteria,116 which ultimately 
lead to the law becoming a threat to fundamental rights and the public’s health. 
Quarantine is warranted when exposure is coupled with indicators of infection. 
Therefore, “wholesale quarantines of [healthcare workers] lacks a scientific 
[validation]” and the necessary balance of benefits over burdens required under 
Jacobson.117 
B.  REMOVING THE EMERGENCY EXCUSE 
1.  HIV Criminalization 
The rush to quarantine individuals due to a distorted understanding of public 
health and public health law is nothing new. In the 1980s there was a strong push to 
quarantine any individual who tested positive for HIV to help control the epidemic.118 
“There was an AIDS-quarantine ballot initiative in California, and various states 
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threatened or passed conditional quarantine measures.”119 These measures were 
infrequently used, and states eventually abandoned the idea of quarantine as an 
appropriate response to controlling the spread of HIV.120 
Having dealt with the HIV epidemic for over three decades, the current spread of 
the now chronic condition can hardly be categorized as an “emergency.”121 Yet, the 
manner in which some states choose to minimize the spread of the disease lacks 
scientific reasoning, and appears more likely to be based on stigma, stereotypes, and 
an uneducated comprehension of the condition.122 Despite medical progress and 
enhanced knowledge about the disease, HIV stigma and discrimination are still 
prevalent.123 Unsurprisingly, a majority of states utilize criminal laws to prosecute 
HIV-positive individuals for certain behavior, thereby using the criminal law as a 
deterrent and a means to control the spread of the disease.124 
Between 2008 and 2013, there were at least 180 prosecutions of individuals under 
HIV criminalization laws.125 Most importantly, many of the laws used for these 
prosecutions do not require intent to transmit the virus or actual transmission of the 
virus.126 Consequently, these laws ignore much of what we know today about viral 
loads and the risks of transmission. With advanced medical understanding of HIV, we 
now know that if the virus is detected early enough and if medication is taken 
regularly, an individual can reduce his or her viral load to the point where it is nearly 
impossible to transmit the virus.127 Hence, prosecution of these individuals lacks 
scientific justification when considering risk of transmission, especially if additional 
measures are taken, such as using a condom. 
Nevertheless, that is exactly what happened to a man in Iowa who was sentenced 
to twenty-five years in prison for a one-time sexual encounter when he had an 
undetectable viral load and used a condom.128 The prosecution was based on the fact 
that he knew he was HIV-positive and did not disclose it to his sexual partner.129 Prior 
to sentencing, he spent nine months in prison because he could not afford his $250,000 
bond, six weeks of which were spent in solitary confinement.130 Spending twenty-three 
hours a day in a cell, he served another four months of his twenty-five year sentence 
before a letter-writing campaign had his sentence reduced to time served and required 
he register as a sex offender.131 These types of prosecutions are easily distinguished 
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from those involving people who lie and intentionally expose unknowing partners to 
the virus, such as a man in Michigan who “admitted to police that he was trying to 
infect as many people as possible” and had unprotected sex with thousands of 
partners.132  
Criminalization of sexual encounters that contain little risk of transmission are not 
even the most egregious examples of laws that run counter to empirical evidence. 
Despite the fact that the CDC has concluded that spitting has never been shown to 
transfer HIV,133 numerous states have laws criminalizing spitting on others for HIV-
positive individuals.134 Contradictory to scientific understanding, convictions have 
occurred as recently as 2014,135 and in 2010 an “HIV positive [man] was sentenced to 
five years in prison for second-degree assault after he was convicted of spitting on a 
police officer.”136 
Without proper scientific justification, these laws are not only objectionable from 
a legal standpoint, but they are also bad public health policy as well.137 To be punished 
under these statutes a person must know they are HIV-positive.138 Therefore, these 
laws might incentivize people to avoid learning their status. Public health officials 
have spent years encouraging everyone to get tested, and research funding is being 
directed at discovering easier ways for people to determine whether they are HIV-
positive.139 Yet, these laws counteract those efforts. They further compound their 
ineffectiveness by perpetuating stigma of both the disease and the HIV-positive 
community, which only stands to exacerbate the public health harm these laws create. 
2.  Childhood Vaccinations 
Another example of the tension between science, politics, and paranoia outside of 
the context of an emergency is the seemingly endless debate over childhood 
vaccination requirements. It is unquestioned that states have the authority to pass 
compulsory vaccination laws, and every state mandates that children be vaccinated to 
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attend school.140 But all states allows exemptions for medical contraindications to 
immunization, which are justified because the harms to the individual are not 
outweighed by the benefits since herd immunity can be achieved without vaccinating 
individuals who fall under this exemption.141 Controversy exists because forty-seven 
states allow religious exemptions and twenty states allow philosophical exemptions, 
with Mississippi, West Virginia, and now California allowing neither.142  
As discussed earlier, religious exemptions for generally applicable vaccination 
laws are not constitutionally required.143 Therefore, philosophical exemptions are not 
required either.144 In fact, the reason that Mississippi does not allow for religious 
exemptions is because the Supreme Court of Mississippi declared them 
unconstitutional in Brown v. Stone.145 In this case, the court held the exemptions 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “in that it would 
require the great body of school children to be vaccinated and at the same time expose 
them to the hazard of associating with children exempted under the religious 
exemption . . . .”146  
Meanwhile, other courts have questioned the ability and wisdom of the State in 
attempting to evaluate which beliefs properly fall within these exemptions.147 States 
have varying requirements for obtaining religious and philosophical exemptions, 
ranging from signing a standardized form to a more arduous screening process.148 In 
LePage v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court had “questions concerning the extent to 
which the government should be involved in the religious lives of its citizens.”149  
Meanwhile, the court in Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School 
District struck down the exemption in the statute that was limited to “bona fide 
members of a recognized religious organization.”150 The court utilized the three-prong 
test established by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman to determine the 
constitutionality of laws challenged under the Establishment Clause, and held that this 
exemption provision violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment.151 The court opined that governmental investigation into a 
person’s beliefs “in essence puts the individual on trial for heresy.”152 
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In McCarthy v. Boozman, the religious exemption in question was analyzed under 
the Lemon test as well and was judged to have failed at least the second and third 
prongs, if not all three.153 The court found that because there was a limited religious 
scope and only certain denominational preferences were afforded the choice, the 
exemption failed under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as well as the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.154 While there is a legitimate 
state interest in trying to limit improper evasion of immunization, it is clear that this 
interest cannot compel the state to deem certain beliefs more valid than others.155 
Consequently, it appears the safest way to include a constitutional exemption is to 
allow anyone who wants to opt out of vaccinations to do so, which would jeopardize 
the entire purpose of a mandatory vaccination law. 
If these exemptions are not constitutionally required and they are so difficult to 
constitutionally implement in a manner that would limit their exploitation, why do so 
many states incorporate them into their vaccination laws? Again, it can be traced 
largely to misinformation, fear, and politics.156 A distorted view of the risks associated 
with childhood vaccination stems from a fraudulent report connecting the Measles, 
Mumps, and Rubella (“MMR”) vaccine to autism; however, there are also individuals 
who believe vaccines can cause other dangers to children.157 Meanwhile, a growing 
number of parents do not believe that vaccines fit in their vision of an organic, all-
natural upbringing.158 
Despite vaccinations being one of the greatest public health achievements, and the 
scientific consensus that childhood vaccines are safe and effective, a large number of 
children are being put at risk due to political pressures and misrepresentations of 
facts.159 “Vaccine refusal has been associated with outbreaks of invasive H. influenzae 
type b disease, varicella, pneumococcal disease, measles, and pertussis.”160 The CDC 
“declared endemic measles eliminated in 2000” and, yet, in 2014 the United States had 
the largest number of cases since 2000 with 644.161 In 2015, the CDC reported 121 
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measles cases in a little over a month stemming from an outbreak that began at 
Disneyland in California.162 The Disneyland outbreak was so severe that there may 
have been a greater risk of death from the spread of measles than from the Ebola 
“emergency.”163  
Meanwhile, pertussis, or whooping cough,164 has reemerged with a study showing 
“that states with easy nonmedical exemption[s]” have a fifty percent higher rate of the 
disease.165 During an outbreak in between 2011 and 2012, forty-nine states reported a 
surge in cases and “20 deaths [were] reported nationally.”166 And in 2013, there were 
approximately 25,000 cases across the country.167 
While parental rights are important and deserve respect, they do not supersede 
state obligations to protect the public’s health or the health of any child.168 Courts have 
consistently held that the religious or philosophical beliefs of a parent do not grant 
them a constitutional right to place their child at risk of harm simply because they are 
not at the age of majority.169 Certainly few people would question judicial intervention 
to overrule a parent’s decision to forgo a child’s blood transfusion due to religious or 
personal beliefs.170 Yet thousands of children are needlessly placed at risk as a result of 
the politics and personal philosophies that reject an abundance of empirical evidence 
demonstrating vaccine safety, efficacy, and public health benefit. 
IV.  PUTTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH BACK IN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW  
“If there is one article of faith in public health, it is that policy should be based on 
objective and rigorous scientific methodologies.”171 This sentiment seems so obvious 
and, yet, there are countless examples of how public health law, whether being 
exercised through the legislative, executive, or judiciary branch, has failed to meet this 
standard. It is important to reiterate that this not only raises constitutional concerns, it 
ultimately is bad for the public’s health. When the law becomes its own threat to 
general welfare, concern should arise about the sincerity of whether the state actually 
has society’s best interest as its primary concern. When decisions are hastily made or 
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based more on public fear and political pressures, the public trust in public health law 
is inevitably going to falter.172 Through a refocused effort to recognize the scientific 
foundations of public health law, a coordinated effort among state and federal public 
health partners, and more appropriate judicial oversight, we may be able to restore the 
legality of, and faith in, the law’s ability to protect, and even improve, society’s well-
being. 
A.  RENEWED FOCUS ON HEALTH 
Though Ebola is not the only infectious disease of concern, and quarantine is not 
the only public health measure that can be deleterious to health when misused, the 
mishandling of the Ebola “outbreak” in the United States provides a tangible, recent 
example of what can go wrong when decisions are made without a focus on science 
and data. The emphasis on scientific data as justification for actions to control 
infectious disease is not only necessary to protect civil liberties, but also to increase the 
chance that policies will improve health outcomes. “[W]e have no hope for 
meaningfully and effectively responding to pressing societal challenges if we distort 
the facts to engineer outcomes that satisfy our preexisting biases or political 
allegiances.”173 Providing sound, data-driven justifications for infringing upon 
individual rights enables a more efficient public health response by building trust with 
the population whose constitutional rights are being limited.174 It creates public trust 
not only by encouraging confidence in the rationale for the decisions made, but also in 
the accountability of those making the decisions.175 
Public trust is key to an effective public health response. Providing the public with 
data enables them to better understand the threat and what they can do individually to 
help mitigate potential harm. A lack of trust could cause many to “cease complying 
with . . . recommendations,” thereby exacerbating the risks of spreading the disease.176 
Compulsory measures should be a last resort, not just to protect liberty, but because 
encouraging voluntary measures helps to maintain the belief that the citizenry has a 
role to play in controlling the disease.177 A dictatorial response is likely to cause 
people to feel they have no say in the matter.178 Feeling a lack of control, especially in 
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public health emergencies where anxiety is heightened, enhances the possibility that 
people will become more defiant.179 
The emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) presents 
another recent example that illustrates the importance of public trust in their 
government’s methods of handling infectious diseases.180 Despite the severe and 
sudden emergence of SARS, there was little need to install compulsory quarantines by 
force because, as with most serious public health threats, most people were happy “to 
take precautionary measures voluntarily.”181 Yet, in Beijing, China, a rumor that the 
government was planning an involuntary, large-scale quarantine caused nearly 250,000 
people to flee, unquestionably increasing the risk that the disease would spread.182 
Again, the suspicion of government abuse of coercive powers increased the probability 
of harm.183 
The unwillingness of states to utilize self-monitoring is even more puzzling in the 
case of Ebola. Many individuals quarantined were healthcare workers returning from 
efforts to stem the tide of the epidemic in West Africa, trained professionals with 
Ebola experience and expertise, and people familiar with the transmission, symptoms, 
and consequences of the disease.184 Moreover, these individuals understood that their 
best chance for survival was to report any symptoms as soon as they arose.185 This is a 
group that is best equipped to self-monitor, and if the government refuses to trust 
them, what are the odds that they would trust anyone else in a future infectious disease 
scenario?  
And, certainly, the media has a role to play.186 Even though Dr. Spencer traveled 
throughout New York City before reporting to the hospital with a fever, his eventual 
reporting should have been hailed as an example of the ability of healthcare workers to 
self-monitor.187 After forty years of accruing scientific data on Ebola, we know that 
individuals are not contagious in early symptomatic stages when they are experiencing 
a fever, and so Dr. Spencer reported to the hospital to be tested before becoming 
contagious.188 Indeed, despite the hysteria surrounding his travels within the city, no 
other individual contracted Ebola from Dr. Spencer’s decision to go bowling or use 
public transportation.189 Yet, his ability to move freely is one of the primary thrusts 
behind political and public support of mandatory quarantines. 
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The continued politicization of infectious disease response only stands to enhance 
the lack of confidence in government decision-making, especially absent objective 
scientific justification. For example, seventy-six percent of Democrats had a favorable 
view of the federal government’s Ebola response, as compared to fifty-four percent of 
Republicans.190 Meanwhile, “72% of Republicans expressed confidence in the federal 
government’s response. . . . to [the] avian flu in 2006” when their party was in power, 
while 52% of Democrats approved.191 Given the importance demonstrated in public 
trust and cooperation to control the spread of disease, these statistics are quite 
interesting. During infectious disease outbreaks, apprehensiveness is high, and 
government officials may feel political pressure to take strong action.192 Yet, it is 
exactly in these circumstances when abuses of power are most likely to occur.193 
Empirical evidence is critical to the public’s acceptance of whether these decisions are 
justifiable, and to persuade them that they are based on more than the momentum of 
politics.194 
In addition to increasing the community’s cooperation, trust, and adherence to 
public health policies, a sound scientific foundation can improve the response to 
control the disease in indirect yet very important ways. With years of funding cuts and 
political apathy stripping funds available for public health response, it is imperative 
that frontline efforts of healthcare workers, such as physicians and nurses, be 
encouraged.195 Needlessly forcing quarantines on those we rely on to stay the spread of 
disease is counterproductive and a waste of limited resources.196 Compulsory policies 
that lack scientific justification are likely to discourage healthcare workers from 
voluntarily putting themselves at risk.197 Moreover, the cost of placing twenty-four 
hour surveillance and unnecessarily quarantining 2815 military members at $2000 per 
person hardly seems worth the expenses demanded from taxpayers.198 
Unreasonably quarantining people not only restricts their freedoms by 
constraining them to a specified location, but it places them at risk of secondary harms 
as well. There are lost wages that accrue from being unable to work, and a risk of 
losing one’s job entirely, which in turn has disparate impact on those of low 
socioeconomic status.199 A small minority of states have enacted laws prohibiting 
employment discrimination against individuals in quarantine, but many of those laws 
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that have been passed are quite “weak.”200 Some do not apply to those who voluntarily 
enter quarantine, and Iowa is the only state affording a remedy of reinstatement.201 
Meanwhile, Massachusetts is the only state to offer compensation, but a 1907 law 
limits that compensation to three dollars per day.202 
There is also the damage caused by stigmatization, which is largely fueled by 
misinformation. Many people, who never became infected, were never symptomatic, 
never exposed, or never in the vicinity of where Ebola victims, were tormented, 
mistreated, and unable to return to work or school.203 The inability of the government 
to provide accurate information to the public and enact complimentary legislation to 
minimize harms suffered only adds to the injurious effects of infectious diseases. Too 
often public health decisions are made with a narrow focus. The aggregated costs 
suffered due to inefficient and unnecessary state action certainly outweigh the benefits 
of over-inclusive public health policies.204 Given the diminished resources of the 
public health infrastructure, evidence-based practice in infectious disease is not only a 
legal imperative, but a moral imperative as well.205 
B.  COORDINATION OVER FEDERALISM 
It is unquestioned that states have the constitutional authority and obligation to 
protect the public’s health through their police power.206 Yet, it is important to 
remember that they do not hold exclusive jurisdiction over public health matters.207 A 
debate over federalism is beyond the scope of this paper and, arguably, should be 
beyond the scope of infectious disease response.208 A discussion over the role of the 
states versus the federal government in controlling the spread of disease should remain 
pragmatic to ensure an efficient and effective response. “A national, state, and local 
presence exists in most spheres of public health”209 and, in terms of constraining 
infectious diseases, especially during emergency epidemics, the role of each is critical. 
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Unlike most advanced industrial countries, the United States does not have a 
national public health agency.210 As such, coordination and collaboration among the 
various levels of government are vital to successfully counter disease outbreaks.211 
State and local authorities will be able to assess the circumstances on the ground and 
respond swiftly;212 therefore, it would be counterproductive to remove their power to 
address these diseases. However, depending on the magnitude of the crisis, an 
appropriate response likely still requires coordination among the states rather than ad 
hoc approaches that may counteract one another and confuse the public.213  
It would seem logical to enable the CDC to coordinate large-scale, multistate 
responses, as they already provide states with “technical assistance, research, [data, 
and] guidance.”214 However, states’ willingness to disregard the CDC’s expert 
recommendations undermines the CDC’s credibility and authority on disease 
control.215 The CDC was criticized and questioned once Ebola entered the United 
States and began to spread to multiple states while local officials simultaneously 
ignored the CDC’s guidance.216 Some even questioned how or why states would fail to 
follow CDC’s guidance, as this failure displayed a lack of understanding and 
transparency of the roles of federal versus state authorities.217 While the states are 
under no statutory obligation to follow the CDC,218 the federal agency with expertise 
in infectious diseases should be empowered to coordinate efforts among the states and 
to educate the public to minimize fragmentation and misunderstanding.219 
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The CDC bases its recommendations on research and data,220 with less political 
influence than state politicians. A stronger role of a federal, expert authority basing 
decisions on objective measures, rather than poll numbers, would increase the 
likelihood that decisions are made in the best interest of health. At the federal level, 
there is additional insulation from more localized political pressures, which creates a 
better environment for making data-driven decisions.  
During the Ebola scare, there were demands made for President Obama to employ 
closure strategies along the border and install travel restrictions to and from certain 
countries.221 Yet, President Obama resisted,222 following the guidance of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the CDC.223 Border closures and travel restrictions 
hurt the fight against Ebola by making it more difficult to get supplies, personnel, and 
resources to West Africa to fight the disease, and by potentially driving the disease 
“underground, causing the outbreak to spread undetected and continue indefinitely.”224 
This is not to say, however, that mistakes or questionable decisions cannot happen at 
the federal level. President Obama’s decision to implement enhanced screening for 
Ebola at five domestic airports has been described as “wasteful, specious, and harmful 
to the public’s health,” with a feeling that the decision was made due to pressure from 
Congress and media scrutiny.225 
There is also a question as to how intrastate any infectious disease can truly be 
anymore. “We live in a world where we are all connected by the air we breathe, the 
water we drink, the food we eat, and by airplanes that can bring disease from anywhere 
to anywhere in a day.”226 While deliberations over the role of state versus federal 
government “seem to arise in nearly every major, modern infectious disease health 
threat[,]”227 these debates seem out of date and ignorant of modern times. Illustrative 
of this point is the measles outbreak mentioned earlier, which began in Disneyland in 
California and quickly spread to seventeen states.228 Again, the point is not to remove 
the role of the state and local officials to respond to the needs and health of their 
citizens. It is merely to accept the fact that to tackle most infectious diseases, or at least 
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a true outbreak, there needs to be a coordinated interstate effort that is well informed 
on best practices for protecting the public’s health.229 
C.  SCIENCE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY  
“In a constitutional democracy, particularly in a field in which empirical 
information is critical, there is always a question of what role courts should play in 
reviewing the decisions of the politically accountable branches.”230 As previously 
mentioned, the State is within its right to infringe upon individual rights for the 
protection of the public’s health.231 But given the advances in law and science, a court 
granting unquestioned deference to the State would be archaic.232 Indeed, a willingness 
to unquestioningly accept the government’s claim of justification is what “opens the 
door to . . . abuse.”233  
The judiciary has a strong obligation to scrutinize these decisions, as it is also 
quite clear that there are limits on the power to restrain civil liberties in the name of the 
general welfare. After all, “[t]o what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose 
is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by 
those intended to be restrained?”234 In the public health sense, it is required that there 
be a sufficient risk of harm, a manner which can be rationally thought to mitigate that 
harm, and that the burdens of restricting individual rights are sufficiently outweighed 
by the benefits.235 Thus, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is”236 and to enforce those constitutional limitations 
when the other branches of government overstep their bounds.  
The judiciary’s role in providing a check on unnecessary public health measures is 
nothing new. In 1900, the court in Jew Ho v. Williamson struck down a quarantine 
imposed on Chinese residents in San Francisco not only because of its discriminatory 
intent, but also because it did not have the requisite ability to actually control the 
spread of disease.237 Physicians submitted expert opinions on the ability of the 
quarantine to achieve the government’s stated goal, and the court found that it “cannot 
ignore this evidence . . . as to the ineffectiveness of this method of quarantine against 
such a disease as this.”238 
Despite the court relying on experts over a century ago to determine whether a 
state order would actually improve the public’s health, this precedent has not held 
through the years. For example, during World War I over 20,000 women were 
quarantined “on suspicion of spreading syphilis and gonorrhea” when many of those 
being held had neither disease.239 Most of these women were suspected prostitutes, 
begging the question of whether these measures were undertaken for public health or 
criminal purposes.240 Unfortunately, through the years the precedent of deference has 
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seemed to carry more weight than the precedent of stringent evaluation of a reasonable 
connection to the government’s means and the public health ends.241 
Not all cases will involve such overt invidiousness as the Jew Ho case, and absent 
this blatant disregard for equal protection many courts simply look the other way.242 
Courts must reassert themselves as the last line of protection for civil rights when there 
is a risk of governmental abuse of power. With a clear restriction on individual 
liberties, the judiciary must require “clear and convincing evidence.”243 It is in times of 
panic when there is greater potential for authoritarian governance that judicial 
oversight is most sorely needed.  
The recent Ebola scare exposes the discrepancy of consequences that can occur 
when there is proper judicial appraisal and when it is absent. Kaci Hickox was stuck 
for over eighty hours in a tent without cause or sufficient explanation, and with no 
judicial approval prior to the quarantine.244 Conversely, it was the sound legal analysis 
of a judge in Maine that released Ms. Hickox from an unnecessary quarantine for lack 
of sufficient scientific evidence.245 While Ms. Hickox was eventually released from an 
excessively overbearing restriction, countless others were held absent sufficient 
evidence-based reasoning.246 Given the severe deprivation of liberty that quarantine 
entails, courts cannot continue the habit of providing “rubber stamp[s]” of approval.247 
As stated previously, the abuse of quarantine power is but one example of the 
potential for unjustifiable laws in the name of public health. Similar to the quarantine 
of prostitutes under the guise of preventing the spread of venereal disease, HIV 
criminalization laws unjustifiably conflate public health and criminal laws.248 Courts 
must carefully examine these laws when cases come before them. “The courts must 
obey the constitution, rather than the lawmaking department of government, and must, 
upon their own responsibility, determine whether, in any particular case, these limits 
have been passed.”249  
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Ignorance of empirical evidence can no longer be an excuse for unconstitutional 
public health policy. It is inaccurate to understand courts as simply deciding the case 
before them because, just as laws can impact stigma and social understanding of 
infectious disease, so too do courts play an instrumental role in establishing the norms 
of society.250 Their power to create precedent carries weight not only with other courts 
or future cases, but also with public perception. Therefore, it is imperative that courts 
accept their role and duty to uphold evidence-based standards in public health law and 
to force the often slow evolution of politics to hasten itself toward justice. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This emphasis on scientific evidence is no panacea for every public health matter 
where a just balance must be struck between individual rights and the general welfare. 
Indeed, empirical evidence is not required in all legal determinations, and in many 
disputes data is unlikely to be dispositive.251 Furthermore, scientific facts will not 
answer normative questions or make inherently difficult decisions in times of crisis 
easier to make.252 But what it will do is restore a rational and constitutional approach 
to improving the public’s health. 
The Ebola “outbreak” in the United States was relatively small and, yet, hundreds 
of lives were impacted by the actions of the government, rather than by the disease 
itself. If a similar approach is taken for a larger epidemic in this country, the burdens 
suffered from state action could be even more severe, not only in terms of direct and 
indirect harms from government measures, but also from the potentially unwarranted 
actions that may increase the spread of disease. With the increase of social media, the 
twenty-four-hour news cycle, and partisan politics, the risk of fear driving legal 
decision-making may be rising. There must be a reemphasis on the scientific 
requirements of public health law now—not once another infectious disease has 
emerged.  
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the 
Government’s purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”253 It 
is long past the time when experience should have taught us that the best means for 
protecting civil liberties and the public’s health in the context of infectious disease is 
to require scientific support for governmental action. The politicization of public 
health has grown into its own epidemic and has transformed the law into a public 
health threat. The most disappointing aspect of the response is that the antidote—
utilizing empirical evidence—is already available, but this remedy needs to be taken 
much more regularly. 
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